We document a previously unknown source of information exploited by sophisticated institutional investors: the Freedom of Information Act, a law that allows for the full or partial disclosure of previously unreleased information and documents controlled by the United States government. Through our own FOIA requests, we uncover the identities of several large institutional investors, chiefly hedge funds, that routinely request value-relevant information from the Food and Drug Administration. We first provide a detailed analysis of how FOIA requests are generated, the kind of information commonly requested by institutional investors and its costs. We then document that the target of FOIA requests are large firms that experience periods of low profitability and high stock price volatility. Finally, we show that FOIA requests allow institutional investors to generate abnormal portfolio returns and provide evidence suggesting that the FOIA information is not systematically known to other investors in the marketplace.
Introduction
On July 4, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a law that allows for the full or partial disclosure of previously unreleased information and documents in the domain of agencies of the Executive Branch of the United States government. It provides that any "person" (including U.S. citizens, foreign nationals, organizations, associations, and universities) has the right, enforceable in court, to obtain access to federal agency records, with some restrictions. 1
While the practice of submitting FOIA requests is known to be common among news agencies and law firms, it is less known that, over the years, it has become a common approach for sophisticated institutional investors, such as hedge funds, to obtain potentially value-relevant information on corporations.
Specifically, institutional investors routinely take advantage of FOIA to acquire information from over forty-two federal agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Energy. To a large extent, this should not be surprising. Being among the first to know that a pharmaceutical company receives warnings from the FDA, that an investment bank is under investigation by the SEC, or that new environmental regulations are being discussed by the EPA can provide potentially profitable trading opportunities in securities of the corporations that may be affected by such events.
This information can be particularly important because, while it is public and legal to trade on, it is not always publicly disseminated and, therefore, is not always available to the rest of the marketplace.
Analogous to the current debate about high-frequency traders achieving faster access to security pricing data, one might wonder how certain institutional investors obtain public information faster than other investors, and the advantage conferred by this faster access in generating trading profits.
In this paper, we focus on FOIA requests submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible for protecting public health through the supervision of matters including food safety and over-the-counter pharmaceutical drugs. We focus on FDA FOIA requests because we believe that such information is especially likely to be value-relevant to investors. Specifically, pharmaceutical companies invest an enormous amount of human capital and monetary resources in the development of new drugs, and several studies show that FDA decisions have a large impact on stock prices. For example, using an event-study methodology, Bosh and Lee (1994) and Sharma and Lacey (2004) show that FDA decisions on new products are not fully anticipated by the market, and are associated with positive or negative abnormal returns on the day that the FDA announces the approval or rejection 1 of a drug.
There are several significant information events in the life of a new drug, which allow several opportunities to study the impact of FDA FOIA requests on security prices. Even after a drug has been approved, many of its side effects are not known until it is released to the consumer market. At this stage of drug development, the FDA conducts a so-called "post-market surveillance" which entails initiating investigations, issuing warning letters, and even recalling drugs from the market. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) show that these recalls have a disproportionately large impact on the stock price of the pharmaceutical company, compared to the direct costs associated with the recall. Dowdell, Govindaraj, and Jain (1992) focus on the Tylenol incident, and show that a single FDA packaging regulation resulted in a total of $11 billion in capitalization losses across the Pharma companies affected, much more than the direct costs associated with the newly introduced regulation.
Our study of FOIA information requests is motivated by an important differentiator in this type of information release. That is, information obtained through FOIA requests is publicly available, but is not publicly disseminated, because it is disclosed only to persons submitting a specific FOIA request.
While the media could potentially disseminate this information through repeated FOIA requests, it doesn't systematically cover everything that could be relevant to sophisticated investors. Thus, our study of FOIA-requested information explores a heretofore ignored gap between information that is released to federal agencies, and, thus, is presumably public, and information that is directly released to -or pursued by -the media. 2 Furthermore, FOIA requests do not always involve trivial costs, as the FOIA requester is required to pay fees that range from a few dollars to several thousand dollars, depending on the complexity of the request. And, much of the information obtained through FDA FOIA requests, such as the results of clinical trials, is highly technical and requires specific scientific competence to be correctly interpreted. Thus, the type of FOIA-requested information represents information that often carries significant search costs, unlike information generally revealed by the media.
All of this suggests that sophisticated institutional investors should be very natural FDA FOIA requesters. That is, they can benefit from the information disclosed by the FDA by improving their investment decisions; analyzing FOIA-requested information may provide valuable large-scale investment opportunities for their funds, and the large scale of investment enables them to hire the specialized human capital required to process technical information. Accordingly, we identify a set of institutional investors that have submitted FDA FOIA requests for filings of U.S. publicly listed firms.
Then, we study how the holdings of stocks of these firms by the institutional investors change, prior to and after they receive the FOIA information, to assess whether the changes in their holdings predict future returns. In other words, we study whether these institutional investors use FOIA information to achieve abnormal returns on their portfolios.
Specifically, we focus on FOIA requests submitted to the FDA by large institutional investors, that 2 Many studies investigate the impact of media releases of information on stock prices, such as Tetlock (2007) .
is, those filing their stockholdings each quarter on SEC Form 13F. 3 We examine those FOIA requests that are related to specific firms having stock return information available on CRSP, as FOIA filings can also be made, for example, regarding general industry information or for information on firms without publicly traded equity. FOIA requests through the FDA meeting our requirements have exhibited substantial growth in recent years, from only 6 in year 2000 to 75 in 2012. This growth in requests mirrors the growth in other approaches likely used by institutions to gather information more quickly than their competitors, such as the use of sales information through Amazon, fads information through Twitter, or consumer search information through Google. However, unlike these other information-gathering sources, FOIA information (as noted above) is not always available at a low cost, nor is the precise interpretation of the information possible for most institutional investors.
Accordingly, we first examine the types of institutional funds that tend to request information through FOIA. Besides being large institutions, FOIA-requesters tend to be hedge funds, have a higher level of portfolio turnover (consistent with greater active management), hold stocks with greater idiosyncratic risk (consistent with more private information), and have experienced high recent inflows relative to other funds (consistent with having liquidity available to make speculative investments).
Next, we examine the characteristics of stocks that are targets of FDA FOIA requests. Here, we find a significantly higher level of FOIA requests aimed at stocks in the pharmaceuticals industry that have a larger market capitalization (consistent with liquidity), higher levels of idiosyncratic risk and turnover on the day of the FOIA request (consistent with more private information), lower riskadjusted returns and profitability (consistent with recent large and uncertain capital investments), and higher levels of R&D expenditures (consistent with having higher levels of private information generated by such activities).
The institutions that make FOIA requests often trade on this activity, as indicated by changes in their 13F quarterly holdings. Of the 529 FOIA requests to the FDA that we consider, 155 (29%) are accompanied with stock purchases, 162 (31%) with sales, and 212 (40%) with no position changes. 4
As econometricians without complete information or the specialized interpretative skills that may be possessed by institutions prior to their FOIA requests, we infer whether they possess such skills by examining the abnormal returns accruing to their trades that occur in conjunction with a FOIA request. To do so, we focus on stock-quarters where a FOIA request was made, and where an institution who made the request traded. We find that, when institutional holdings increase in conjunction with a FOIA request, the following quarter four-factor alphas on the associated stocks average 5.26%.
On the other hand, when institutional holdings decrease, the following quarter four-factor alphas average -3.09%; both of these average alphas are statistically significant at the 1% level. And, such stock purchases exhibit positive four-factor alphas 66% of the time, while stock sales exhibit negative four-factor alphas 64% of the time. All of these results indicate that FOIA requests are an important conduit through which institutional investors gather value-relevant "private" information about pharmaceutical stocks.
We recognize that institutions that make FOIA requests may have greater skills, in general, in analyzing stocks-and may not actually benefit from their FOIA requests. To rule out this possibility that fund abnormal returns are only spuriously correlated with FOIA requests, we control for manager skills in two unique ways. To control for institutional manager skills in trading stocks that have been a target of FOIA at some particular point-in-time, we compute the abnormal return of the trades of these stocks during quarters where the institution did not submit a FOIA request, but did submit a FOIA request during a different quarter in our sample. We find that the stock returns are greater (lower) when stock-holdings increase (decrease) during the same quarter as a FOIA request, relative to the same stock during a quarter when a FOIA request by that institution did not occur. Secondly, it is also possible that certain institutional managers have time-varying skills (e.g., Avramov and Wermers (2006) ), and their FOIA requests simply coincide with quarters where their skills are higher (and, perhaps, have nothing to do with the information obtained through FOIA).
To control for the possibility of time-varying skills by a given institutional manager across all stocks, we compute the returns that are not associated with a FOIA request, but that pertain to the same manager and the same quarter of the request. We find that, compared to the non-FOIA stocks traded during the same calendar quarter of a FOIA request, the FOIA-related stock returns are higher when stock-holdings increase and lower when stockholdings decrease. Further confirmation that FOIA requests generate unique value-relevant information is provided by the fact that FOIA requesters' trades exhibit a low correlation with the trades of other institutional investors, as well as to analyst recommendation changes.
Supporting the view that institutional investors find the FOIA information relevant for their investment decisions, and that certain institutions have advantages in processing this information, we find a considerable amount of persistence in the requests, in the sense that once certain investors "discover" this new source of information and start submitting FOIA requests, they continue doing so during the following years. Thus, certain institutions appear to gain advantages in accessing and interpreting FOIA-based information, perhaps partly due to their specialized investment researchers learning how to use this information over time.
Our work contributes to the literature examining the role of information on institutional investors' performance. Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) show evidence that managers with greater skills are less responsive to changes in public information, presumably because they rely more on private information. Massa and Rehman (2008) , Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009 ), Ivashina and Sun (2011 ), Massoud, Nandy, Saunders, and Song (2011 ), and Griffin, Shu, and Topaloglu (2012 put forth evidence in favor of -or against -the assertion that financial institutions trade on the basis of private information acquired via their investment banking and loan renegotiation activities. Our work introduces FOIA 4 requests as a new and different source of information actively used by institutional investors. A key aspect of FOIA requests is that the requesters consider the information potentially useful for their investment decisions, because they actively request it and they pay a fee for it. Furthermore, the information requested is hybrid in nature. It is not private, because any person 5 has potential access to it, but it is not publicly disseminated, because only those who request it and can understand and process the information content will benefit from it. Finally, the FOIA information is objective and unfiltered as it comes in the form of technical reports. This feature distinguishes it from the information reported by analysts and journalists, where the information is influenced by the interpretation of the author(s).
We also contribute to the literature debating whether institutional investors are skilled, and the sources of any such skills. Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) find that the stocks purchased by funds have significantly higher returns than the stocks they sell. Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007) show that actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds have positive timing ability. 6 On the other hand, Griffin and Xu (2009) show that hedge funds are no better than mutual funds at stock picking and that hedge funds exhibit no ability to time sectors or pick better stock styles. Other studies analyze the behavior of institutional investors in particular circumstances, such as the Asian currency crisis of 1997 (Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2000) ), the technology bubble of 2001 (Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) ), the Lehman bankruptcy of 2008 (Aragon and Strahan (2012) ) the financial crisis of 2007 (Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012 ), around forced CEO turnover (Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) ), and prior to earnings announcements (Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2010) ). Our work is unique in this respect, because we isolate institutional investors that receive specific information on a given stock, and then evaluate how that information affects their holdings and performance. Overall, our results show that these investors are able to translate the FOIA information received into profitable trades. Thus, we show that one source of skills for some institutional investors, chiefly hedge funds, is their ability to quickly obtain and process information that is publicly available, but associated with non-trivial search costs.
Finally, we contribute to the literature that studies the interaction between law and finance. Legal rules are crucial for the functioning of financial markets (see La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)), and the effect of regulations on investors' behavior has been studied extensively, see Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) , Ellul, Pagano, and Panunzi (2010) and del Guercio (1996) . Our paper is the first to assess the impact of the Freedom of Information Act on financial markets. In this respect, our work is also pertinent to the current political debate on whether the Freedom of Information Act should extend to all government agencies. For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act included provisions to shield some agencies -such as the SEC -from FOIA requests, but these provisions were repealed in September 2010. Finally, another area of contentious debate is how accessible should FOIA information be. In this respect, the FOIA Oversight and Implementation Act of 2014 amends the Freedom of Information Act in order to make it easier and faster to request and receive information.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a case study as a motivation for our empirical analysis; Section 3 describes how we construct the data; Section 4 investigates the characteristics of FOIA requesters, FOIA subjects, and the information that is commonly requested from the FDA. Section 5 assesses the profitability of the trades that are associated with FOIA requests; Section 6 provides evidence that the FOIA information is not systematically available to other investors or analysts. Section 7 concludes. Of course, we cannot know how SAC interpreted the information contained in the documentation received from the FDA. Using 13F filings, however, we do know that the FOIA response was associated with a large increase in the stock holdings of Charles River Labs by SAC. 10 In particular, as shown by the green circles and bars (and the associated green y-axis values on the right) in Figure 3 , the number of shares held by SAC increased from 69,965 on September 30, 2011 to 240,000 on December 31, 2011.
Because we can only observe holdings at a quarterly frequency, we cannot establish when trades were actually executed. However, we would expect portfolio managers to attempt to acquire information before executing a trade and not afterwards, so the timing of the request seems to suggest that the buy trades were executed sometime between December 28 and December 30, 2011 (since December 31 was a Saturday), and were, at least in part, motivated by the information obtained by the FDA The Baltimore Sun commented, "When you own a stock that is widely regarded as undervalued, it doesn't always take real news to get it moving." Others argued that, because the stock was so undervalued, the company was at risk of a take-over. For comparison, we report (in red) the cumulated returns on the S&P 500 index. From the graph, we can infer the return realized by SAC for different potential sell dates. For example, SAC would have achieved a return of 26.09% if the shares were sold on January 31, and 32.05% if the shares were sold on March 30. 11 These returns are remarkable, compared to the same holding-period returns on the S&P 500 of 5.29% and 12.00%, respectively. In terms of economic magnitudes, these returns amounted to capital gains of $4.65 × 26.09% = $1.21 million on a single trade over one month, or to $4.65 × 32.05% = $1.49 million over one quarter, which are very large even for a hedge fund of the size of SAC Capital.
Our example above is a simple illustration of the process associated with FOIA requests, ranging 10 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, investment advisors controlling at least $100,000,000 in U.S. equities are required to report their U.S. stock holdings in excess of 10,000 shares or $200,000 on Form 13F to the Securities and Exchange Commission .
11 Once annualized, these returns would amount to 313.08% and 119.28%. The next sections of our paper attempt to address these questions. In doing so, we exploit a unique dataset constructed from records directly obtained from the FDA through our own FOIA requests, augmented with data from the CRSP, COMPUSTAT, I/B/E/S and 13F filings databases. In the next section, we describe our collection of FOIA information from the FDA.
Construction of the Data
The data collection procedure can be summarized in the five steps described below.
3. Depending on the agency, the FOIA logs have different formats. The FOIA logs we received from the FDA are in .pdf format and contain: 1) a control number that uniquely identifies each FOIA request; 2) the day on which the request was received by the FDA; 3) the date on which the FDA response is due; 4) the FDA offices and the divisions to which the request is pertinent; 5) the identity of the individual and/or firm requesting the information; 6) and the subject of the FOIA request. The descriptions of these two logs contain a number of key words that recur throughout the data. For example, "EIR" stands for Establishment Inspection Report, which refers to the report generated by the FDA when inspecting the facilities of a given drug producing company; "WARNING LTRS" stands for Warning Letters issued by the FDA to a particular company; "CORR" stands for correspondence between the FDA and the company; and "RECS" stands for the company records held by the FDA for a particular company.
The fourth record is a FOIA request generated by Blake Goodner, a healthcare research analyst at Bridger Capital. Bridger capital requested warning letters, correspondence, as well as copies of the 483 forms 12 issued by the FDA to the company Kyphon Inc. -a biomedical company that specializes in spinal cord injuries.
The fifth FOIA is initiated by Kendle Regulatory Affairs, a regulatory consulting company. The seventh FOIA is associated with a private individual, who obviously wanted to conceal his identity, as he submits the request under the name "John Doe". Finally 5 out of the 14 FOIA requests were submitted by "FOI Services Inc", a firm specialized in filing FOIA requests. These firms charge hefty fees, but have become quite popular among requesters who want to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. 13
As hinted in the examples reported above, the FDA FOIA requesters generally fall in six broad categories: private individuals, law firms, news firms, consultancy firms, firms specialized in FOIA requests and investment firms. Given the focus of this study, we concentrate on the requests generated by the last category.
Step 2: Identify the Institutional Investors among the FOIA Requesters
We scan the 176,734 FOIA log records and isolate the ones initiated by institutional investors using the following procedure. We first download from the Thomson Reuters 13F database the list of institutional investors that filed their positions with the SEC since 1990. We then store, for each FOIA log record, all the words contained in the requester field. Finally, we match the names of the institutional investors to the ones contained in the requester's field. This last exercise is performed in a number of different ways, i.e. from requiring multiple-words matches to unique word matches and by way of exact matches as well as fuzzy matches.
12 The 483 form is issued by the FDA to document and communicate concerns discovered during plant inspections. 13 Below we report excerpts from the company FOI SERVICES INC describing their services: "Looking for a specific FDA file? FOI Services maintains a private library of over 160,000 documents in all categories of products regulated by the agency. [...] If we don't already have the document you need, we can place a request to the government for you. With over 27 years of experience using the Freedom of Information Act, we'll construct a request that contains the information the government needs to efficiently process the order. If requests similar to yours have previously yielded no information, we'll let you know up-front, before you've waited in vain.
Of course, we hold every inquiry confidential. Every request carries the FOI nameso no one knows the products, processes, and companies you're researching."
Step 3: Identify Public Companies among the FOIA Subjects
We scan the 176,734 FOIA log records and isolate the ones that pertain public companies whose stocks are listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. Once again, this task is completed using a procedure similar to the one reported for step 2. We first download from the CRSP database the list of firms whose stock price was available since 1990; we then store, for each FOIA log record, all the words contained in the subject field. Finally, we match the CRSP company names to the ones contained in the subjects field.
Step 4: Hand-Check of the Results Computed in Steps 2 and 3
The computer codes written for steps 2 and 3 reduce the number of relevant entries to approximately 20,000. In the fourth step we make sure that each record is hand-checked by at least two individuals to guarantee that no false positives are left in the dataset. The final number of FOIAs we isolate is 529.
Step 5: Generate the Panel Dataset to Conduct the Profitability Analysis
The final step generates the panel dataset used in our profitability analysis. For each institutional investor, this panel contains the quarterly holdings, the daily prices and returns, all the available accounting characteristics, and the analysts' recommendations for the stock(s) subject to a FOIA request. The quarterly holdings are obtained from the Thomson Reuters 13F dataset, the returns and prices are from CRSP, the quarterly stock accounting information are from COMPUSTAT, and the analysts' recommendations data are from I/B/E/S. The next section highlights the salient features of the dataset at hand.
The Anatomy of FOIA Requests
This section summarizes the Freedom of Information Act requests contained in the dataset. Recall that in order to be included in the dataset, a number of criteria have to be met. First, the FOIA request has to be initiated by an institutional investor whose stock holdings are recorded in the 13F dataset.
Second, the FOIA request should entail one or more companies whose stock prices are available from CRSP. Finally, the FOIA request must be submitted to the FDA, and not another federal agency.
The setup is quite restrictive for a number of reasons. First, as mentioned in Section 3, investors often rely on third-party firms that specialize in submitting FOIA requests, making their requests untraceable. Second, institutional investors often request information about firms whose stocks are traded on stock exchanges outside the US, or about firms whose stocks are not listed on exchanges.
Finally, institutional investors often request industry-wide information, which cannot be assigned to any particular company. We decided to maintain such a restrictive approach because we wish to guarantee that the events contained in our dataset have a clear identification in terms of the requesters, the subjects of the request and the information disclosed by the FDA. Broader setups can be accommodated at the potential cost of blurring the link between information exchange and institutional investor actions. To quantify how investors that submit FOIA requests differ from those that don't, we estimate the following Logit model:
if institutional investor i submits a FOIA request at least once in the sample 0 otherwise,
where, following Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013) , x it includes the covariates described below.
Risk is the monthly portfolio total volatility during the past 12 months ending in this quarter-end.
Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residuals from the Fama-French model augmented with Momentum using monthly returns for the 36-month period ending in the current quarter. Portfolio Returns is the monthly average return of the portfolio during the quarter.
The construction of the variables just described assumes that the institution maintains the holdings of the previous quarter-end throughout the quarter. Turnover is the inter-quarter portfolio turnover rate, calculated as the lesser of purchases and sales, divided by the average portfolio size of the last and current quarters as imputed using 13F holdings. Age is the number of years since the institution's first appearance in the Thomson Reuters 13F holdings file. Size is the total equity portfolio size, calculated as the market value of its quarter-end holdings; and Herfindal is the Herfindahl index of the portfolio, calculated from the market value of each component stock. Flow is the absolute change in total portfolio value between two consecutive quarters, net of the change due to returns, scaled by the portfolio size at the previous quarter-end. The model is estimated at the quarterly frequency and includes year-quarter time-effects δ t to account for time trends in the covariates. Table 2 reports the results for two specifications. The first includes Risk, while the second includes Idiosyncratic Risk. We keep the two regressors in separate specifications to avoid collinearity problems.
The coefficients on size and turnover indicate that large institutional investors that trade very actively are more likely to submit FOIA requests. The reason is that they are probably the investors with greater incentives to collect information, because they trade more frequently. It is also likely that they are able to process complex information, because being larger means that they can afford to hire individuals with specialized skills and knowledge. The coefficients on risk indicate that the institutional investors that submit FOIA requests tend to invest in riskier stocks. Interestingly, also the coefficient on fund flows is significant and positive. Finally, the remaining coefficients are not statistically significant. The figure also highlights that, once requesters start submitting FOIA requests, they continue doing so over the following years. This can be seen by noting that the majority of the graphs in Figure 7 are upward sloping throughout the sample period. Finally, a few FOIA subjects are specialized Biotech firms. For example, Alexion Pharmaceuticals is specialized in delivering therapies to patients with ultra-rare diseases. 16
How do the stocks that are targets of FOIA requests differ from those that aren't?
To answer this question we analyze the characteristics of the FOIA stocks and compare them to two different groups of stocks. The first is the universe of stocks included in the CRSP database, while the second is the universe of Pharmaceutical companies categorized using standard SIC classification codes. 17 We denote the FOIA stocks using an indicator variable and we regress it on a set of stock-market and accounting variables. We estimate the following specification at the quarterly frequency:
if firm i is the subject of a FOIA request at least once in the sample 0 otherwise,
where x it denotes the set of explanatory variables and δ t are year-quarter time-effects. We group the regressors into four categories that proxy for return, risk, institutional investors' preferences and fundamental firm characteristics.
The return category contains: Returns, computed as the quarterly returns of a stock; and Riskadjusted Returns, computed as the quarterly abnormal returns obtained from the Fama-French model augmented with momentum, estimated a the daily frequency.
The risk category contains Idiosyncratic variance, a measure of idiosyncratic risk computed as the quarterly sum of daily squared residuals obtained from the Fama-French model augmented with momentum; and Realized variance, a measure of total risk computed as the quarterly sum of the daily squared returns.
In terms of the institutional investors' preferences, Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick 15 Note that Biogen Idec Inc was the result of the merger between Biogen Inc and Idec Pharmaceuticals in 2003. 16 In the United States, a disease is defined as rare if it affects fewer than 650 patients per million of population. In contrast, a disease categorizes as ultra-rare if it affects fewer than 20 patients per million of population. Most ultra-rare diseases affect as few as one patient per million or less.
17 Based on the Fama-French industry portfolios the Pharmaceutical companies are those with SIC codes 2830 -2839, 3693 -3693, 3840 -3859, and 8000 -8099 13 (2001) show that institutional investors prefer stocks with high visibility, high volatility and low transaction costs, while Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) show that over time they have shifted their preferences towards smaller and riskier securities. To account for the findings in this literature we include: Turnover, measured as the ratio between volume and shares outstanding; "Analyst Coverage", measured as the number of analysts recommendations for a given stock; and Age, measured as the number of days since the stock entered the CRSP database.
Finally, we include the following accounting variables: Profitability, computed as the ratio between operating income before depreciation (COMPUSTAT item: OIBDPQ) and total assets (COMPUSTAT item: ATQ); Size, computed as the log of total assets; R&D, computed as the ratio of research and development expenses (COMPUSTAT item: XRDQ) and sales (COMPUSTAT item: SALEQ); 18
Market-to-Book ratio, computed as the ratio of market value of assets and the book value of assets; 19
and Market Leverage, computed as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the market value of assets.
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 3 . Panel A, that reports results using all the stocks contained in the CRSP database as benchmarks, contains coefficient estimates for two specifications. The first specification includes risk and returns, while the second includes idiosyncratic risk and risk-adjusted returns. We do not include these regressors in the same specifications because of collinearity concerns. The results indicate that the FOIA stocks tend to have higher profitability, higher market capitalization, higher market-to-book ratios, lower leverage and tend to more mature firms. Interestingly, they are also characterized by higher R&D and analyst coverage. The results suggest that these companies are characterized by large amounts of public information as processed by stock analysts, but they are also difficult to value because of the complexity of their operations. It is therefore not surprising that certain institutional investors would try to obtain relevant information exactly on these stocks.
The results in Panel B are consistent with those in Panel A, except for the analyst coverage coefficients that are now insignificant. This difference is consistent with pharmaceutical stocks being more complex, and therefore harder to value, than the average stock in CRSP.
To assess whether firms are the targets of FOIA requests on a continuous basis or whether specific events trigger the bulk of the requests, we report in Figure 8 
When are FOIA requests generated?
We now assess whether variations in the characteristics of the FOIA stocks can explain the timing of the requests. We restrict the analysis only to the stocks that have received at least one FOIA request throughout the sample and denote the FOIA request day using an indicator variable. We estimate the following model at the daily frequency:
if firm i is the subject of a FOIA request on day t 0 otherwise,
where γ i denotes stocks' fixed effects, δ t denotes year-quarter fixed effects and x it denotes the set of explanatory variables described in Section 4.2, with the exception that the returns and the risk variables are estimated recursively using a three-month rolling window of daily observations ending at time t. Starting from the risk and return variables, the results indicate that risk, as measured by either realized or idiosyncratic variance, is significantly positively related to the probability of receiving a FOIA request. The opposite holds for returns, that are instead negatively related to the probability of a FOIA request. Specifications 5 and 6 further highlight a significant degree of interaction between the two sets of regressors as they both become more significant when included in the same specification.
This suggests that firms that undergo periods of high uncertainty and low market returns are more likely to be targeted. These findings are consistent with such stocks having greater levels of uncertainty about their profitability, as well as, potentially, greater levels of private information.
The remaining regressors highlights a few interesting facts. First, a drop in the firm profitability increases the probability of a request, indicating that firms undergoing financial hardship are more likely to be inquired on. Second, institutional investors do not seem to target firms on which information becomes more scarce, as analyst coverage is positively related to the probability of a FOIA request. Rather, it seems that requests are triggered by the uncertainty regarding the value of the stock as highlighted also by the positive and significant coefficient on turnover, usually taken as a measure of differences in opinion, see Karpoff (1987) and Harris and Raviv (1993) .
Out of the remaining variables, we highlight that market capitalization and the market-to-book ratio are positively related to the probability of a FOIA request, while market leverage, assets and age do not seem to have a significant impact.
15

What Information is Requested?
For 233 FOIA requests out of 529, we were able to obtain some further documentation from the FDA in addition to the one contained in the FOIA logs. While the data is far from complete, it allows us to get a sense of what type of information is usually requested, how expensive are FOIA requests and the profile of the individuals, within the investment firms, that submit the FOIA requests.
In the majority of the cases, the institutional investors request copies of Establishment Inspection
Reports (EIRs) and the 483 forms. 20 They also request detailed documentation related to the FDA Adverse Event Reporting Systems and MedWatch, which are the two systems used by the FDA to collect negative side-effects associated with the drugs on the market. Finally, they request not only copies of the warning letters issued by the FDA, but also the minutes of the FDA meetings associated with them and the response of the pharmaceutical companies. We conclude that inquire about potentially negative news, or the lack thereof.
A few exceptions relate to some requests that explicitly ask for the clinical trials supporting new drug applications, possibly with the intent to predict the likelihood of the drug being approved.
Finally, to highlight the degree of sophistication of these institutional investors, we report below one request submitted by Erik Keisman (PhD) of Capital World Investor :
"I would like to request a record of FOIA requests from individuals wishing to obtain Form 483 reports issued to Novartis AG, relating to inspections of pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities. [. . . ] In essence, I want to know how many people are requesting the same information that I have requested, in a related FOIA request submitted to your office."
The requestors, in the majority of the cases, are highly sophisticated individuals with very strong background in medicine, chemistry and bio-chemistry. In particular, one in four of the requesters holds a PhD, a Medical Degree, or both.
Interestingly, many of the FOIA requests contain the maximum price that the requester was willing to pay for the information. A quick tabulation reveals that at least a quarter of the requesters were willing to pay "any fee" or "reasonable fee" for the information. The maximum price, for those that indicated one, ranged from $100 to $2000 dollars. In terms of actual price paid, on the other hand, our data indicates that the average FOIA response is associated with a rather small price of $70 and that the price is mainly driven by the administrative labor costs charged by the FDA. In some cases, the requests can be quite expensive and reach $5,000 or more, but these cases were very rare in our sample.
Profitability of FOIA Requests
In this section we investigate systematically the relations analyzed in our case study of Section 2. In particular, we first estimate the profitability of the trades associated with FOIA requests. We then control for managers' skills and assess, for each institutional investor, whether the trades connected with FOIA requests are more profitable than those that aren't. We conduct this analysis to gain insights into how large are the abnormal returns generated by FOIA requests.
Main Results
In our baseline tests we first compute the change in the stock holdings, for the investor that has submitted a FOIA request. We focus on the specific stock and quarter associated with the request.
We then compute the quarterly cumulative abnormal returns for that stock, starting from the end of the quarter over which the FOIA request is filed. The cumulative abnormal returns for stock "i" from day t 0 to day T are computed as:
(1 +ˆ i,s ) − 1 whereˆ i,s is the abnormal return of stock "i" at time "s" and is computed using three different return models. The first is the Fama-French model, augmented with Momentum:
where M kt s , HM L s , SM B s , and M OM s are the excess returns at time s for the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index, the size, the value, and the momentum factors. The second is the single-factor market model:
and the third, and simplest, is the constant (iid) return model:
whereμ i is the average excess return of stock "i" over the estimation window. All parameters are estimated recursively using a quarter of daily observations ending at time t 0 − 1.
Before turning to formal statistical tests, the top panel of Figure 9 shows the abnormal return densities associated with the Fama-French model, computed for the quarter after the FOIA request has been submitted. We divide the stocks in three groups. In the first, we plot cases where investors' stock holdings decrease after the FOIA request (red dashed-dotted line). In the second, investors' stock holdings increase after the FOIA request (blue dashed line). In the third, investors' stock holdings remain unchanged after the FOIA request (black solid line). The second and third panels repeat the exercise, using abnormal returns computed with the Market and Constant models, respectively.
For the Fama-French model, the return density when investors' holdings increase are right-shifted, compared to the return density when investors' holdings decrease, with the blue line peaking to the right of the zero-return mark (the median equals 7.20%) and the red line peaking to the left of it (the median equals -5.90%). The black line, associated with no changes in holdings, lies in the middle, with a median value of -0.43%. The results are qualitatively similar when we use the other two model specifications.
Moving to formal statistical tests of the findings displayed in Figure 9 , Table 5 Overall, these results suggest that the information contained in the FOIA response could be a source (among potential others) of the profitability of these trades.
To further corroborate the analysis reported above, Panel C (Panel D) of Table 5 relates the median (average) returns to the changes in investors' stock holdings. For the Fama-French model, the results show that, when the investors increase their stock holdings, the median (average) return is 7.20% (5.26%); when the positions remain unchanged, the median (average) return is -0.43% (4.16%);
and when FOIA-requesting institutions decrease their holdings, the median (average) return is -5.90%
(-3.09%). Statistically, the median returns after positive and negative changes in stock holdings are statistically different from zero at the 1% level, while the median return for the unchanged stock holdings is not significant. For average returns, on the other hand, the results indicate 1% statistical significance for no change and a positive change in stock holdings, and no statistical significance for a negative change in stock holdings. The difference in results for the mean and median indicates that the returns associated with no changes in instituitional investors' holdings have a substantial degree of positive skewness, as evidenced by the plots reported in Figure 9 . Once again, the other model specifications provide similar results.
Finally, we present in Table 6 
Results Controlling for Managers' Skills
The results reported in Section 5.1 did not control for investors' skills. Chen and Liang (2007) and Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007) show that some hedge funds and mutual funds possess significant skills.
Furthermore, Kacperczyk, Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) provide evidence of stock picking ability in booms, and market timing ability in recessions.
It is possible that the institutions that we follow do not generate abnormal returns due to the FOIA information, and that such abnormal returns are spuriously correlated with the requests. To address this concern, we control for managers' skills across two separate dimensions. First, we control for the possibility that institutional investors are able to predict abnormal returns in their FOIA stocks, even in those periods when they do not submit FOIA requests. Second, we control for the possibility that FOIA investors are particularly skilled at the time of the FOIA request, and therefore perform well across all the stocks they hold in their portfolio at that time.
Skills in FOIA Stocks Across Time
To test whether the investors that submit FOIA requests can consistently predict the abnormal returns of the FOIA stocks, we undertake the following exercise. First, for every manager-stock pairing, we compute the abnormal return associated with changes in holdings following the procedure described in Section 5.1, but limited to those quarters where a FOIA request was not submitted by the institution.
In other words, we compute the abnormal return of the trades that are not associated with a FOIA request, but that pertain to the same manager and the same stock for which a FOIA request was submitted at some point in the sample.
Second, for both FOIA and non-FOIA trades, we separate the cases where the stock holdings have increased from the cases where they have decreased, and we compute the empirical percentile of the FOIA return as the percentage of non-FOIA returns smaller than the FOIA return. More formally, we compute for each manager "i" and stock "j":
where R i,j,t is the FOIA return at time t, R i,j,s is the non-FOIA return at time "s" and "S" represents the dates of all the non-FOIA returns for manager "i" and stock "j". We compute an equivalent expression when stock holdings decrease.
The rationale for splitting the two cases is that, if the FOIA requests allowed for better investment decisions, we would expect the stock abnormal returns to be more positive if the manager increases the holdings of a stock, and more negative if the manager decreases the holdings.
In Figure 10 we report the percentiles' distributions across both stocks and institutional investors.
The left panels plot the results when stock holdings decrease across the Fama-French, Market and Constant models, while the right panels report the equivalent results when stock holdings increase.
Starting from the positive holding changes, the top-right panel of Figure 10 shows that the FOIA returns are higher than the non-FOIA returns, as the average and median of the percentiles' distribution equal 0.58 and 0.61, respectively. This indicates that the returns of the stocks are greater when stock holdings increase in conjunction with a FOIA request. Furthermore, the fact that the median is greater than the mean indicates that the distribution is skewed to the left.
Moving to negative changes in holdings, the top-left panel of Figure 10 shows that the FOIA returns are lower than the non-FOIA returns, as the average and median of the percentiles' distribution equal 0.4 and 0.32, respectively. This indicates that the returns of the stocks are lower when stock holdings decrease in conjunction with a FOIA request. Furthermore, the fact that the median is much lower than the mean indicates that the distribution is heavily skewed to the right.
The middle and bottom panels of Figure 10 show that the results are largely consistent when we use the Market and the Constant models to compute abnormal returns.
Time-Varying Skills Across All Stocks
We now control for the possibility that FOIA investors are particularly skilled at the time of the FOIA request, and, therefore, perform well across all the stocks they hold in their portfolio during that quarter. For each manager in our sample, we compute abnormal returns for all stocks traded when a FOIA request is submitted. Specifically, we compute the returns of the trades that are not associated with a FOIA request, but that pertain to the same manager and the same quarter of the request.
We then separate, for both FOIA and non-FOIA trades, the cases where the stock holdings have increased from the cases where they have decreased, and we compute the empirical percentile of the FOIA return as the percentage of non-FOIA returns smaller than the FOIA return. More formally, we compute for each manager "i" and stock "j":
where R i,j,t is the FOIA return at time t, R i,k,t is the return of the non-FOIA stock "k" at time t and 20 "K" is the set of all non-FOIA stocks traded by manager "i" at time t. We compute an equivalent expression for negative changes in holdings.
Finally, in Figure 11 we report the percentiles' distributions across both stocks and institutional investors. The left panels plot the results for holdings decreases across the Fama-French, Market and Constant models, while the right panels report the equivalent results for holdings increases.
Starting from the positive holdings changes, the top-right panel of Figure 11 shows that the FOIA returns are higher than the non FOIA returns, as the average and median of the percentiles' distribution equal 0.60 and 0.68, respectively. This indicates that the FOIA stock returns are greater than the non-FOIA stock returns. Moving to the negative holding changes, the top-left panel of Figure   11 shows that the FOIA returns are lower than the non-FOIA returns, as the average and median of the percentiles' distribution equal 0.44 and 0.40, respectively. This indicates that the FOIA stock returns are smaller (more negative) than the non-FOIA stock returns.
The middle and bottom panels of Figure 11 show that the results are largely consistent when we use the Market and the Constant models to compute abnormal returns.
Is the FOIA Information Available to Other Market Participants?
We now assess whether the trades of FOIA requesters are unrelated to the trades of all other institutional investors that do not submit a FOIA request. If the two are not related, and the FOIA funds are able to predict future returns as shown in Section 5.1, we argue that there is evidence that the FOIA information is not systematically available to other investors through other means. Furthermore, because it has been widely documented that institutional investors follow analysts' recommendations, we also assess whether the FOIA trades are unrelated to analysts' recommendations.
The results, based on multinomial logit specifications and non-parametric Pearson χ 2 tests, indicate that the FOIA trades cannot be explained by the actions of these market participants.
Can the FOIA Trades be Explained by those of other Institutional Investors?
As argued by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992) and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) , investment managers are expected to display similarities in their trades if they base their investment strategies on the same indicators. Furthermore, managers may trade with the crowd due to the reputational risks of acting differently from other managers, as modeled by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) .
We hypothesize that the trading behavior of the FOIA funds is orthogonal to that of the other funds for at least two reasons. First, the fund manager should trade on the basis of the FOIA information only if he/she thinks it is valuable. Second, he/she should think that the information is not available to others in the market place because, if it was, it would already be incorporated into asset prices.
To systematically assess this hypothesis, we conduct the following exercise. This impression is confirmed by the p-value of the Pearson χ 2 test, that being equal to 0.471, suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the trades are independent.
To corroborate the contingency table results, we report in Panel B.I. the evidence of a multinomial logit regression specified as:
where P i,j is the probability that the i-th FOIA is associated with an increase in holdings (j = 1) or a decrease in holdings (j = 2). The probability that there is no change in the holdings represents our base case and is equal to
. The vectors of coefficients for holdings increases and decreases are β 1 and β 2 , while the vector of independent variables is denoted by x i and includes the intercept as well as the median change in non-FOIA institutional investors' holdings. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood, see Greene (2003) .
The results, reported in Panel B.I., show that none of the coefficients on the non-FOIA institutional trades is able to explain the positive or negative changes in FOIA funds stock holdings. Furthermore, the Pseudo-R 2 is only 0.25%, indicating that there is no relation between the trades across the two groups.
To conclude, our results indicate that the FOIA trades are largely disjointed from the trades of the other institutional investors in the market. This supports the view that the information contained in the FOIA responses is not widely available to all other institutional investors.
Can the FOIA Trades be Explained by Analysts' Recommendations?
We now conduct a similar analysis using analysts' data as a large literature has shown that the trades of institutional investors are closely related to analysts' recommendations. For example, Franck and Kerl (2013) show that mutual funds significantly increase (decrease) their holdings in stocks when any of the consensus forecast measures increases (decreases) within the quarter prior to the observation period. Furthermore, Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2007) find that both large and small traders react to recommendations, but that large investors are more sophisticated in the sense that they react more when valuable information is contained in analysts' recommendations revisions.
To assess whether analysts' recommendations can explain the trades of the FOIA funds we compute the median change in recommendations across all the analysts covering the stock at the time of a FOIA request. We distinguish three cases: upgrade, downgrade, and no-change. We then interpret an upgrade (downgrade) as a signal to increase (decrease) the holdings of a stock and, based on this principle, construct the relative frequencies of recommendations and FOIA trades in Panel A.II. of Table 7 . We cannot reject the null that FOIA trades and analysts' recommendations are independent as the Pearson χ 2 test has a p-value of 0.114.
The contingency table results, however, uncover an interesting relation between FOIA trades and recommendations. In particular, the joint probability that FOIA funds decrease their holdings in conjunction with upgrades is 11.1%, higher than the joint probability associated with downgrades, which equals 6.8%. Similarly, FOIA funds are more likely to increase their holdings in conjunction with downgrades (joint probability=13%) than upgrades (joint probability=9.5%). To conclude, our results suggest a weak negative relation between FOIA trades and analysts' recommendations and therefore provide evidence that the FOIA information is not widely incorporated in financial markets when exploited by FOIA requesters.
Conclusions
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows for the full or partial disclosure of previously unreleased information and documents controlled by the United States government. In this paper we show that FOIA requests are actively used by sophisticated investors to gather information about pharmaceutical firms.
We uncover that the most active FOIA requesters are institutional investors, mainly hedge funds, that are larger and trade more frequently than their peers. They submit FOIA requests on stocks that are complex to value and they do it in periods of high firm-specific and market-wide uncertainty.
We find a considerable amount of persistence in their requests, in the sense that once they "discover" this new source of information and start submitting FOIA requests, they continue doing so 21 Computed using Equation 21-47, (Greene, 2003, Page 721) during the following years, supporting the view that institutional investors find the FOIA information relevant for their investment decisions, and that certain institutions have advantages in processing this information, Our study confirms that FOIA-related information is valuable, as it allows institutional investors to generate substantial trading gains. In particular, when institutional holdings increase in conjunction with a FOIA request, future quarterly abnormal returns on the associated stocks average 5.26%.
On the other hand, when institutional holdings decrease, future quarterly abnormal returns average -3.09%. These results are robust to controlling for investors' firm-specific skills and time-varying market-wide skills.
Finally, we document that specializing in FOIA requests is profitable because the information acquired is not widely available to the other agents in the marketplace, as evidenced by the fact that FOIA requesters' trades are not congruent with those of other institutional investors and analysts'
recommendations.
24 This table compares the characteristics of FOIA and non-FOIA institutional investors using a Logit model at the quarterly frequency. The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the investor has submitted a FOIA request at least once in the sample and the value 0 otherwise. The universe of institutional investors included in the analysis are those that appear in the Thomson Reuters 13F database. Reported are coefficient estimates and their t-statistics (in parentheses). What follows is a description of the covariates included. Risk is the monthly portfolio total volatility during the past 12 months ending in this quarter-end. Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residuals from the Fama-French model augmented with Momentum using monthly returns for the 36-month period ending in the current quarter. Portfolio Returns is the monthly average return of the portfolio during the quarter. The construction of the variables just described assumes that the institution maintains the holdings of the previous quarter-end throughout the following quarter. Turnover is the inter-quarter portfolio turnover rate, calculated as the lesser of purchases and sales divided by the average portfolio size of the last and current quarters. Age is the number of years since the institution's first appearance on Thomson Reuters. Size is the total equity portfolio size, calculated as the market value of its quarterend holdings; and Herfindal is the Herfindahl index of the portfolio, calculated from the market value of each component stock. Flow is the absolute change in total portfolio value between two consecutive quarters, net of the change due to returns, scaled by the portfolio size at the previous quarter-end. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the institutional investors level. Included are quarterly time effects. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Risk is the sum of the daily squared returns, Idiosyncratic Risk is the sum of daily squared residuals obtained from the Fama-French model augmented with momentum, Returns is the return of the stock, and Risk − Adj.Returns computed as the quarterly cumulative abnormal returns obtained from the Fama-French model augmented with momentum. All these quantities are computed using daily data in a given quarter. P rof itability is the ratio between operating income before depreciation (COMPUSTAT item: OIBDPQ) and total assets (COMPUSTAT item: ATQ), R&D, is the ratio of research and development expense (COMPUSTAT item: XRDQ) and sales (COMPUSTAT item: SALEQ), T urnover is the ratio between volume and shares outstanding, Analyst Coverage is the (log) number of analysts recommendations for a given stock, Age is the (log) number of days since the stock entered the CRSP database, M arket Capitalization is the (log of) market value of assets computed as the product of the price and share outstanding, Market-to-Book ratio, computed as the ratio of market value of assets and the book value of assets -where the market value of assets is computed as detailed in footnote 19, M arket Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liability divided by the market value of assets, assets Assets is computed as the log of total assets (COMPUSTAT item: ATQ). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the stock level. Included and quarterly time effects. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table estimates a Logit model at the daily frequency to assess the determinants of a stock being the subject of a FOIA request. The dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 on the day the stock is the subject of a FOIA request and the value 0 otherwise. Reported are coefficient estimates and their t-statistics (in parentheses). What follows is a description of the covariates included. Risk is the sum of the daily squared returns, Idiosyncratic Risk is the sum of daily squared residuals obtained from the Fama-French model augmented with momentum, Returns is the return of the stock, and Risk − Adj.Returns is the risk-adjusted return computed asαi +ˆ it, whereαi andˆ it are obtained from the Fama-French model augmented with momentum. All these quantities are computed using daily data over the previous quarter. P rof itability is the ratio between operating income before depreciation (COMPUSTAT item: OIBDPQ) and total assets (COMPUSTAT item: ATQ), R&D, is the ratio of research and development expense (COMPUSTAT item: XRDQ) and sales (COMPUSTAT item: SALEQ), T urnover is the ratio between volume and shares outstanding, Analyst Coverage is the (log) number of analysts recommendations for a given stock, Age is the (log) number of days since the stock entered the CRSP database, M arket Capitalization is the (log of) market value of assets computed as the product of the price and share outstanding, Market-to-Book ratio, computed as the ratio of market value of assets and the book value of assets -where the market value of assets is computed as detailed in footnote 19, M arket Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liability divided by the market value of assets, assets Assets is computed as the log of total assets (COMPUSTAT item: ATQ). Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the institutional investors level. Included are stocks' fixed effects and quarterly time effects. Coefficients marked with ***, **, and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. where Pi,j is the probability that the i-th FOIA is associated with an increase in holdings (j = 1) or a decrease in holdings (j = 2). The probability that there is no change in the holdings represents the base case and is equal to Pi,0 = Certain material has been deleted from the records furnished to you because a preliminary review of the records indicated that the deleted information is not required to be publicly disclosed and that disclosure is not appropriate. FDA has taken this approach to facilitate the process of responding to you. If you dispute FDA's preliminary determination with respect to these records and would like FDA to reconsider a particular deletion, please let us know in writing at the address listed above within 30 days from the date of this letter. If we do not receive a response in that time period, we will consider the matter closed with respect to these records. If you do request further consideration and if the agency then formally denies your request for any or all of the previously-withheld information, you will have the right to appeal that decision. Any letter of denial will explain how to make this appeal. Responses can be mailed to the address above:
The following charges may be included in a monthly invoice:
Reproduction: $0. If there are any issues with this response, please notify us in writing of your specific concern(s). Please reference the above file number.
If I may be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact me. Figure 6 : This figure reports the number of FDA FOIA requests contained in our database. In order to be included in our database, the requester should be an institutional investor that reports its holdings using 13F filings and the target of the FOIA request should be a company whose stock is listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. Figure 9 : This figure plots quarterly abnormal cumulative returns densities for the stocks that have been the subject of FOIA requests in the previous quarter. The results are computed separately for those stocks whose holdings have been increased by the institutional investors that initiated the FOIA request (blue dashed line), those stocks whose holdings have been decreased by the institutional investors that initiated the FOIA request (red dashed line), and those stocks whose holdings were unchanged by the institutional investors that initiated the FOIA request (black solid line). In the top panel, the abnormal returns are computed using a Fama-French model augmented with momentum estimated. The middle and bottom panels repeat the exercise using the Market and the Constant model, respectively (see Section 5.1 for details). All return models are estimated using daily observations over the previous quarter. 44 Figure 10: This figure compares investors' performance in FOIA stocks when they do and do not perform a FOIA request. For every manager-stock pairing, we compute the returns associated with changes in holdings in those quarters when they submit a FOIA request. We compare them to the performance for the same stocks, but for the quarters when they do not submit a FOIA request. For both FOIA and non-FOIA trades, we separate the cases where the stock holdings have increased from the cases where they have decreased and we compute the empirical percentile of the FOIA return as the percentage of non-FOIA returns smaller than the FOIA return. Finally, we report percentiles' distributions across both stocks and institutional investors. The top, middle and bottom panels report results for the Fama-French model augmented with Momentum, the Market model and the constant model. The results for negative changes in holdings are reported in the left panels, while the ones for positive changes in holdings are reported in the right panels. The solid and dashed vertical lines in each panel report the average and median of the distributions. 
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